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iiTATHrMLNT ill »JUR 1 SDIC'I ION 
The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated (1953) §78-2-2.3(j) . The Court of 
Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to assignment from the Supreme 
Court. Utah Code Annotated (1953) §78-2a-2(k). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND 
STANDARD i)v w'v V i M'W 
Issues: 
A. Whether the trial court properly held that no reasonable 
person could find for the Plaintiffs on their claims for Wrongful 
Detention, Assault, Battery, False Imprisonment, Intentional and 
Reckless Infliction of Emotional Distress, and Invasion of Privacy, 
where the defendants had required the plaintiffs and some thirty-
five co-workers to leave their normal work stations, congregate in 
the company lunch area, some thirty feet from the nearest door, wait 
there for a period exceeding one hour, until each employee had been 
taken individually to a company restroom and physically searched for 
an allegedly stolen twenty dollar bill. 
B. Whether the trial court erred in ruling as a matter of law 
that because Plaintiffs had not submitted any evidence of damages of 
monetary or emotional damages, Defendants were entitled to Summary 
Judgment, where 1) the Plaintiffs had submitted their own and the 
affidavits of family members as evidence of actual emotional 
damages, as well as 2) the Report of one Expert Witness and the 
Affidavit of another, and where 3) the causes of action alleged were 
1 
for the intentional torts of wrongful detention, assault, battery, 
false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress 
and invasion of privacy. 
Standard of Review: 
The Motion for Summary Judgment is based on law, and presents a 
question of law, and as such should be accorded no particular 
deference, but be reviewed for correctness. Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 
P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). Summary Judgment is only proper when 
there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The determination of 
whether the moving party is entitled to a judgment is a question of 
law, which is reviewed for correctness. Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, 
Inc., 818 P.2d 997, 1000 (Utah 1991). The appellate court is 
completely free to reappraise the trial court's legal conclusions. 
Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033, 1038-1039, (Utah 
1989). Furthermore, in determining a Motion for Summary Judgment, 
the Court is required to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of 
the party opposing the Motion for Summary Judgment. Smith v. 
Batchelor, 832 P.2d 467, 468 (Utah 1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: This is a case in tort. There are multiple 
causes of action by multiple plaintiffs against multiple defendants. 
The causes of action include claims for the intentional torts of 
wrongful detention, assault, battery, false imprisonment, 
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intentional infliction of emotional distress as well as claims for 
reckless infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy. 
Course of Proceedings: Plaintiffs filed this case in the Fourth 
District Court of Utah in October 1993, and asked for a jury trial. 
Defendants were served in January 1994. Defendants filed an answer. 
The parties began discovery. In July 1994 Defendant Lynton filed a 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgement requesting that she be found 
not personally liable. The Motion was briefed and argued, and the 
Fourth District Court, Judge Boyd Park presiding, granted Lynton's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed her from the case in 
August 1994. Discovery continued. In October 1994 Defendants filed 
a Motion for Summary Judgment on all claims. This Motion was 
briefed and argued. At oral argument on this matter on February 10, 
1995, the trial court requested that the Plaintiffs submit 
additional evidence of damages, and gave them thirty days to submit 
this additional proof. The trial court also gave the Defendants a 
reasonable amount of time to respond to the additional evidence. As 
requested by the trial court, the Plaintiffs prepared and submitted 
additional proof of damages. 
After filing their response to Plaintiffs7 Second Objection, 
Defendants also filed a Motion to Suppress the Plaintiffs' 
Affidavits. Plaintiffs filed an Objection to this Motion. On May 
22, 1995 the trial court issued a twelve page Memorandum Decision 
granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on all counts. The 
trial court specifically chose not to rule on the Defendants' Motion 
to Suppress. Counsel for the Defendants summarized the trial 
courts' Memorandum Decision into a three page Order. The trial 
court signed that order on July 14, 1995. The Plaintiffs filed 
their timely Notice of Appeal in the trial court on Monday, August 
14, 1995. 
Disposition: The trial court granted both Defendant Lynton's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment. The trial court issued a twelve page Memorandum 
Decision on the second Motion for Summary Judgment, with the order 
that the Defendants prepare an Order consistent with the Memorandum. 
Statement of Facts: Defendants did not submit any factual 
evidence of their own in support of their second Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Therefore, the following facts are unchallenged and, as 
the statement of facts by the party in opposition to Summary 
Judgment must be taken as true for the purposes of this Appeal. 
This statement of the undisputed material facts is based on the 
Plaintiffs' Deposition testimony and three distinct sections of the 
Record. These sections are the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, Record 
pp. 107-99; the Plaintiffs' Affidavits in Opposition to the 
Defendants' Second Motion for Summary Judgment, Record pp. 397-344; 
and the Amended English Translations of these Affidavits, Record, 
pp. 457-420. 
1. In August 1992 the Nevada corporation DOT Adventures acted to 
establish a production facility in Orem, Utah for the purpose 
of manufacturing and selling novelty rubber stamps. 
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2. Plaintiffs were all employed as workers in this facility for 
varying periods of time between August and December of 1992. 
None of the Plaintiffs remained as employees of the facility 
past December 31, 1992. 
3. The language used on the factory floor was Spanish, and the 
vast majority of factory employees, including the factory 
manager, were Hispanic. 
4. Miguelangel Esquivel (Esquivel), the factory manager, had a 
demonstrated pattern of verbally demeaning the factory workers 
with invasive and harassing statements and accusations, such as 
the following: "You are a bunch of thieves, robbers, 
ungratefuls; you are talebearers because you speak badly of the 
company;" [You don't] pay [y]our tithing, and because of this 
things [go] badly in the company; [You are] wetbacks, and if 
immigration came they would take [you] all away; [I am] sick of 
people's gossip, and that [you are] a bunch of scandlemongers. 
5. Esquivel habitually told the plaintiffs and other factory 
workers that they were a bunch of thieves, that he knew that 
they were stealing the stamps. He also told them that he had 
been endowed with the authority that the company president and 
sole officer, Mrs. Jeanette Lynton, had granted him to do 
whatever he wanted with the employees. Basing himself on the 
fact that many of the employees were members of the Mormon 
Church, he would tell the employees that they needed to pay 
their tithing to continue working. He also threatened them by 
saying that if he dismissed them from their jobs, they would 
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have to go to ask help from their bishops to provide food for 
themselves and their families. 
Esquivel would say things to the factory workers such as "I am 
certain that you don't pay your tithing. I know that's why 
things go badly for you." He would also say "I am certain that 
you are a bunch of hypocrites. To my face you smile at me, but 
behind my back you tell tales of me, I am certain." He would 
accuse them of not being able to enter the temple of the 
church. He would accuse them of being wetbacks and say that he 
knew who the illegals were. 
On at least one occasion Esquivel asked in an employment 
interview to see the applicant's LDS temple recommend as a 
purported qualification for the job. 
However, on or around December 17, 1992, Esquivel went beyond 
harrassing words. On that day he gathered the approximately 
forty factory workers into the cafeteria area of the factory 
and informed them that, although he knew it was illegal, he had 
had enough, and was going to require them to submit to a person 
by person private search of their persons and belongings 
because a co-employee reportedly complained that someone had 
stolen twenty dollars from her. 
Esquivel further stated that if anyone wanted to object, he 
could raise his hand, and everyone would then know who the 
thief was. 
Each of the Plaintiffs was required to enter the applicable 
rest room with their supervisor and submit to a search of their 
persons and belongings. The male supervisor was minimally 
invasive in his search, only requiring the men to turn out 
their pockets and open their wallets and lunch bags. However, 
the male supervisor did search the wallets. 
11. The female supervisor, on the other hand, required the women to 
pull their blouses out of their pants or skirts and undo their 
bras, after which she ran her hands around their mid-riffs 
under their blouses. The female supervisor also picked through 
the women's hair with a pencil. 
12. All Plaintiffs were laid off as employees of the company prior 
to January 1, 1993. 
13. In January 1993 Defendant DOTS formally registered as a foreign 
corporation doing business in Utah. 
14. In October 1993 the Plaintiffs in this matter filed suit for 
the intentional torts of assault, battery, false imprisonment, 
wrongful detention, intentional and reckless infliction of 
emotional distress and various counts of invasion of privacy. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in granting the Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment on all counts. The trial court erred in ruling, as 
a matter of law, that no reasonable jury could find in favor of the 
Plaintiffs, on any of their causes of action, on the uncontested 
facts. The trial court also erred on both factual and legal grounds 
in ruling that Plaintiffs had failed to establish proof of damages 
sufficient to permit a jury to find in their favor at trial. 
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Because, according to the trial court, this was the case, there was 
no point in permitting this case to go to the jury. 
This is the first issue the Plaintiffs will address herein. In 
reviewing and arguing this determination, Plaintiffs will examine 
the law applicable to each of their causes of action, the trial 
court's legal findings on each cause of action, and the facts that 
serve as the basis for Plaintiffs' contention that a jury could 
reasonably find in their favor. Because the undisputed facts in the 
record would allow a reasonable jury to find in favor of the 
Plaintiffs on each of their causes of action, the trial court's 
ruling must be reversed, and this case must be remanded for further 
proceedings. 
The second issue on appeal pertains to the trial court's ruling 
as a factual matter that Plaintiffs had submitted no evidence of 
damages, and thus had no cause of action. On this point the trial 
court erred both factually and legally. Plaintiffs did provide 
undisputed, legally admissible evidence of actual damages. The 
trial court erred when it in part ignored and in part ruled 
inadmissable Plaintiffs' evidence regarding their damages. 
Furthermore, in requiring Plaintiffs to submit proof of actual 
damages in order to prevail at Summary Judgment, the trial court 
ignored the availability under the law of both nominal and general 
damages in every one of Plaintiffs' causes of action. 
The undisputed facts of this case are subject to multiple 
interpretations regarding the reasonableness and meaning of the 
actions of the parties. Therefore, the trial court erred in 
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substituting its own judgment for that of a jury. Furthermore, 
despite the trial court's ruling to the contrary, the Plaintiffs 
submitted legally admissible evidence of actual damages more than 
sufficient to create a disputed issue of material fact. Finally, 
the trial court applied the wrong legal standard of damages in 
refusing to allow general or nominal damages in cases of intentional 
tort. For each of these reasons, the trial court's ruling in this 
case must be reversed and remanded for trial. 
ARGUMENT 
Issue I. Whether the trial court properly held that no 
reasonable person could find for the Plaintiffs on their claims 
for Wrongful Detention, Assault, Battery/ False Imprisonment, 
Intentional and Reckless Infliction of Emotional Distress, and 
Invasion of Privacy/ where the defendants had required the 
plaintiffs and some thirty-five co-workers to leave their 
normal work stations, congregate in the company lunch area, 
some thirty feet from the nearest door, wait there for a period 
exceeding one hour, until each employee had been taken 
individually to a company restroom and physically searched for 
an allegedly stolen twenty dollar bill. 
The primary issue on appeal in this case is fairly simple. 
With the exception of the question of actual damages, to be dealt 
with under Issue II, there are no material disputed facts. In 
dismissing most of the causes of action the trial judge made 
reference to the correct standard of law. But Summary Judgment 
dismissing each of the Plaintiffs' eight separate causes of action 
was entirely inappropriate in this case because the trial court, 
rather than submit the case to a jury, substituted his own judgment 
on the determining issues found in the grey area between fact and 
law, often called mixed issues of fact and law. It is a settled 
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principle that, in determining whether there are material disputed 
facts, the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom must be viewed in 
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Smith v. Batchelor, 
832 P.2d 467, 468 (Utah 1992)[emphasis added]. 
In granting Summary Judgment for the Defendants, the trial 
court either completely ignored this principle, or determined that 
in his own judgment, no reasonable jury could possibly rule in favor 
of the Plaintiffs on any of their causes of action. In ruling this 
way, the trial court clearly erred, and thus this case should be 
reversed and remanded. In order to examine more particularly 
precisely how the trial court erred in ruling as he did on each of 
the Plaintiffs' causes of action, the following subsections of this 
brief will examine the supporting facts and reasonable inferences 
that might support a ruling in favor of the Plaintiffs on each of 
their causes of action. 
Wrongful Detention. Plaintiffs' first cause of action is for 
Wrongful Detention. Wrongful detention is a civil cause of action, 
based on the crime of unlawful detention. The elements of the tort 
of wrongful detention are found in Utah Code Annotated (1953) §76-5-
304(1) and are the knowing, unlawful, restraint of a person that 
interferes substantially with his liberty. The following undisputed 
facts are in the record and would support a finding for the 
Plaintiffs on this cause of action. 
As stated in the undisputed facts section above, the 
Plaintiffs, along with more than 35 of their co-workers, were 
required by Defendant Esquivel, the factory manager, to leave their 
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work stations and gather in the factory cafeteria area, some thirty 
feet from the closest door. Then the Plaintiffs were informed that 
because a co-worker had alleged the theft of a twenty dollar bill, 
none of the workers would be permitted to leave the cafeteria area 
until each worker had been personally searched by his or her 
supervisor. Defendant Esquivel informed the workers that they would 
be required to enter the factory bathrooms one by one, where they 
would be searched. (Bardales Deposition, p.23; Record p. 447). 
Defendant Esquivel also stated that he knew that what he was 
going to do was illegal, but that he didn't care.1 Finally, 
Defendant Esquivel stated that if any of the workers wanted to 
object, they could raise their hand, and then everyone would know 
who the thief was.2 
By virtue of his own admission to the workers, it has been 
established that Esquivel knew his actions were illegal. Therefore, 
the specific remaining elements of the tort are those the trial 
court focussed on in its Memorandum Decision (Record, pp. 685-696).3 
Specifically, the trial court found that plaintiffs could not 
prevail against the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment because 
Semiday Deposition, pp. 41; 44; Bardales Deposition, p. 
23; Record, pp. 452 and 439. 
2
 Record, pp. 439 and 447. 
3
 Although under normal circumstances citation to the 
final Order would be more appropriate, where, as in this 
case, that Order summarizes in three pages the trial court's 
twelve page Memorandum Decision, examples of the trial 
court's legal and factual reasoning will be taken from the 
Memorandum Decision, as it is a more complete record. 
11 
they had not proven that defendants substantially interfered with 
plaintiffs' liberty because the plaintiffs knew the location of an 
exit and made no attempt to leave. (Record, p. 689). 
The trial court held that as a matter of law, the Plaintiffs' 
liberty was not substantially interfered with because they could 
have walked out of the plant at any time. However, the Utah statute 
that provides the elements of the crime of unlawful detention, the 
criminal parallel to the tort of wrongful detention, does not 
require that there be no avenue of escape.4 Rather, it simply 
requires that the Defendant substantially interfere with the 
Plaintiffs' liberty to act on their own desires. In this case a 
reasonable presumption would be that the Plaintiffs' desired simply 
to do the job they had been hired to do, and go home at the end of 
the day. Regardless of the fact that the defendants could possibly 
have walked out of the factory at any time, a reasonable jury could 
still find that the Defendants substantially interfered with the 
Plaintiffs' liberty to do the job for which they were hired. 
The trial court's holding that the Plaintiffs were not 
wrongfully detained because they knew where the door was and did not 
4
 Although not controlling, the case of Orem City v. 
Fillmore, (Case # 93 10 0350) is instructive regarding the 
normal interpretation of this statute in criminal cases. In 
that case, a Utah Fourth Circuit case involving the crime of 
Unlawful Detention, the Defendant prevented someone else 
from backing out of a parking space by intentionally placing 
his car behind the parked car. Even though the individual 
in the car was in no way prevented from getting out and 
walking away, the Defendant was convicted of this crime on 
June 7, 1993. 
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walk out of that door ignores the reasonable presumption, based both 
on Esquivel's statements when he ordered the search and on the 
previous threatening statements he had made to the factory workers 
that, had the Plaintiffs chosen to walk out the door, their 
employment with the factory would have been forfeit. 
While unpleasant choices are a part of the daily life of most 
human beings, the deliberate interference with someone else's right 
of self determination requires some form of power over the other 
person—whether that be physical power, economic power, or political 
power. Both criminal law and tort law are intended to protect 
individuals from others who would use their power abusively. The 
basic elements of the abuse of power are codified in case law and in 
statute. However, at the most fundamental level, society at large 
must determine what the words actually mean and what constitutes the 
abuse of power. For this reason the law has removed certain 
determinations from the province of the judge, and given them to the 
community, in the form of jurors. 
The Defendants in this case arguably used the economic power 
they had over the Plaintiffs to require them to leave their work 
stations for over an hour, and enter the factory bathrooms one by 
one to be searched. Whether or not this use of the Defendants' 
economic power constitutes an abuse of that power, sufficient to 
substantially interfere with the Plaintiffs' liberty, is a question 
that must be determined by society, in the form of a jury. The 
trial court on this issue improperly held, as a matter of law, that 
because the Plaintiffs could have escaped merely by sacrificing 
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their continued employment, the Defendants' actions did not 
substantially interfere with the Plaintiffs' liberty. 
This determination by the trial court also implies, as a matter 
of law, that the Defendants' use of their economic power over the 
Plaintiffs did not, and cannot, legally constitute the tortious 
abuse of power defined as Wrongful Detention. Because the 
Plaintiffs have established facts sufficient to support a finding by 
society that the Defendants abused their economic power over them 
and substantially interfered with their liberty, this cause of 
action should be reversed and remanded for trial. 
The defense has also argued that one cannot create a civil 
cause of action from a crime. This is simply not true. Criminal 
law protects the interests of the society at large. In criminal 
cases, the State is the prosecuting party. As a result, the 
standard of proof in a criminal case is always higher than that of a 
civil case.5 However, criminal cases are brought on behalf of the 
state, not the individual, and the general money damages available 
to an individual in a civil case are not available in criminal 
cases, where restitution is limited to actual costs incurred.6 
Therefore, as a matter of public policy, the existence of a crime, 
particularly an intentional crime, presupposes a parallel civil 
See, for example, Privacy in the Workplace, Jon D. 
Bible and Darien A. McWhirter, pp. 4-8 (Quorum Books, 
Westport Conn.) 1990/ The American Law of Torts, Stuart M. 
Speiser, Charles F. Krause, and Alfred W. Gans. (Clark, 
Boardman, Callaghan, New York) 1991, §26:3. 
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cause of action for general damages caused by the unlawful actions 
of the defendants. 
The trial courts' grant of summary judgment on this cause of 
action should be reversed and remanded for trial on the merits 
because there are issues regarding the reasonableness of the actions 
of the parties, as well as issues regarding the reasonable meaning 
of such terms as "substantial interference with liberty" that must 
be determined by the trier of fact. 
Assault. The elements of a prima facie case for civil assault 
are an act, made with the intention to inflict a harmful or 
offensive contact, that places another in apprehension of an 
immediate harmful or offensive contact. Restatement 2d. Torts, §21. 
The interest that is protected by this cause of action is a purely 
mental interest, and requires no evidence of actual damages.7 
a. Intent. The Plaintiffs in this case have testified 
that Defendant Esquivel, acting in his capacity as plant manager, 
told an entire group of some forty employees that they could not 
leave or return to their work stations until each of them had 
entered the appropriate bathroom and been physically searched by 
7
 The Law of Torts, 2nd ed. Fowler V. Harper, Fleming 
James, Jr., and Oscar S. Gray. (Little, Brown & Co, Boston) 
1986. Interference with the person, § 3.4. 
their supervisor.8 Esquivel stated that he knew the search was 
illegal, but that he didn't care..9 
Mr. Esquivel has offered no testimony or other evidence 
regarding his intent. Even if he had, this would be a disputed 
material fact. In either case, the Plaintiffs' version of events 
must, for purposes of deciding the Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, be taken as true. 
The fact that Esquivel stated that he knew the search was 
illegal is prima facie evidence both that he knew a physical search 
of their persons would be offensive to most normal people, and 
further that he intended both the search and the apprehension of the 
search, regardless of their offensiveness. 
Defendant Esquivel's intent may also be reasonably inferred 
from other circumstances of this case, discussed previously, such as 
the relationship between the harm he was allegedly preventing, i.e., 
the stolen twenty dollar bill, and the action he took to remedy the 
harm, as well as the likelihood of proving, even if one were found, 
that a twenty dollar bill on the person of another factory worker 
was the twenty dollar bill alleged to have been stolen.10 A jury 
might well find on the facts of this case that the possibility of 
8
 Record, pp.419-457. 
9
 Semiday Deposition, pp. 41; 44; Bardales Deposition, p. 
23; Record, pp. 452 and 439. 
10
 See, for example, Plaintiff Semiday1s question 
regarding how a twenty dollar bill in his wallet could be 
distinguished from that allegedly stolen. Semiday 
Deposition, pp. 40-41. 
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resolving the theft by a physical search of all the factory workers 
was so remote that Esquivelfs primary motivation and intent must 
have been something entirely different. That same jury might also 
reasonably conclude that the twenty dollar bill was merely an excuse 
for Esquivel to demonstrate his power as factory manager by forcing 
everyone to submit to a search or lose their job. 
This interpretation of the facts is further supported by the 
fact that Esquivel apparently made no attempt to limit the search to 
individuals with some proximity or ability to take the twenty 
dollars. For all of the above reasons, it would be more than 
possible for a reasonable juror to find that, when he required the 
plaintiffs and their co-workers to submit to a physical search, 
Defendant Esquivel acted intentionally and deliberately to create in 
the Plaintiffs and their co-workers the apprehension of an offensive 
touching. The Plaintiffs have further testified that Esquivelfs 
action had that specific effect, and did indeed place them in 
apprehension of an immediate offensive touching. (Record, pp. 419-
457) . 
b. Reasonable Apprehension. Defendants argued before the 
trial court that the mere threat of an offensive contact is not 
sufficient to permit a recovery. But this is a mischaracterization 
of the law. The actual legal principle is more accurately stated as 
follows: 
Words do not make the actor liable for assault unless 
together with other acts or circumstances they put the other in 
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reasonable apprehension of an imminent harmful or offensive 
contact with his person.l:L 
In this case, Defendant Esquivel had the actual ability, in his 
capacity as plant manager, to compel each of the forty factory 
workers to submit to this search or forfeit their employment. He 
further had the power to order the supervisors to search each of the 
workers individually. The fact that Esquivel had the present 
ability to carry out his threat of an offensive contact, and 
actually did proceed promptly to carry out his threat, resulting in 
multiple offensive contacts, is sufficient to establish that the 
Plaintiffs' apprehension of an offensive touching was reasonable. 
The case law and the Restatement 2d Torts recognize a cause of 
action for the right to be free of the apprehension of offensive 
bodily contact.12 Again, the legal distinction is between a mere 
threat and a threat coupled with the ability to carry out the threat 
or some action evincing ability. The present case clearly falls 
inside the line dividing those two situations. Because a reasonable 
juror could find that the Defendants' action created in the 
Plaintiffs a reasonable apprehension of an immediate offensive 
contact with their persons, this cause of action must be remanded to 
permit the jury to decide this issue. 
Consent. The trial court's decision on this and many, if 
not all, of the Plaintiffs' other causes of action was based in part 
on a further finding that, because there was no evidence that 
11
 The American Law of Torts, supra, §26:16. 
12
 Id., §26:15. 
18 
defendants threatened plaintiffs with any violence or harm, no 
reasonable juror could find that the Plaintiffs' submission to the 
search was anything but consent, freely and voluntarily given. 
Consent, where freely given, is an absolute defense to all 
intentional torts. 
However, consent comes in many forms. It may be written, it 
may be an express statement, it may be implied. Different legal 
considerations apply to factual situation. In the present case, 
consent was neither express nor written. Therefore, both the 
consent argued by the defendants and the consent found by the trial 
court must be consent implied from the circumstances. However, here 
again the trial court invaded an area of factual determination 
exclusively the jury's. This is so because implied consent can only 
be a factual determination derived from the totality of the 
circumstances—i.e., based on all the other facts, the finder of 
fact must determine whether the Defendants reasonably implied that 
the Plaintiffs' consented. Comment c to §892 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, (1977) explains: 
If a reasonable person would not understand from the words or 
conduct that consent is given, the other is not justified in 
acting upon the assumption that consent is given even though he 
honestly so believes; and there is no apparent consent. Id. 
The trial court in the present case improperly invaded the province 
of the jury in holding, as a matter of law, that Plaintiffs had 
freely consented to remain and be searched. Because none of the 
Plaintiffs expressly consented, any consent must be implied from the 
totality of the circumstances. In a case that required a comparable 
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determination of reasonableness in a negligence action, the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
Before the question of negligence [or, as in this case, 
consent] becomes one of law, for the court, the facts shown by 
the evidence must be such that all reasonable men must draw the 
same conclusions from them. If the facts proven are such that 
reasonable men may differ as to whether or not there was 
negligence, [or consent], the question is one for the jury to 
consider. Singleton v. Alexander, 431 P.2d 126, 129, (Utah 
1967), 19 Utah 2d 292. [Comments added]. 
The undisputed facts of the present case must include consideration 
of the totality of the evidence, including the previous history of 
verbal abuse, the veiled threats Esquivel had raised previously 
regarding the impact on their families of their unemployment, and 
the possibility of being reported to the INS for deportation. Given 
those two threats in particular, it would not be impossible for a 
reasonable juror to find that Esquivel's threats to the Plaintiffs' 
economic well being and, in some cases, continued physical presence 
in the U.S., coupled with Esquivel's apparent power to carry out 
either or both threats, constituted duress, and that therefore the 
Defendants could not reasonably assume that Plaintiffs' failure to 
object meant, ipso facto, that they freely and willingly consented 
to the search. 
The issue of consent is, except in extraordinary cases, an 
issue for the jury to decide. This is not an extraordinary case, 
precisely because the basic facts may be interpreted in more than 
one way. A jury might find that because none of the Plaintiffs 
objected Defendants reasonably implied that they consented. 
However, in determining whether consent is reasonably implied in any 
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given set of circumstances, the trier of fact is responsible for 
determining whether consent was reasonably implied. Restatement 
§892. 
Furthermore the trier of fact will also be required to 
determine whether that implied consent was given under duress. 
According to §892B of the Restatement, "duress is constraint of 
another's will by which he is compelled to give consent when he is 
not in reality willing to do so." In determining the existence of 
duress, the Restatement requires that the age, sex, mental capacity, 
relation of the parties and any antecedent circumstances be 
considered. Again, it would be reasonable for a jury to find that, 
given the power of Defendant Esquivel to fire the Plaintiffs at 
will, given their limited job skills and the limited alternative 
jobs available to them, and given Esquivelfs previous implicit 
threats against any who might be illegal aliens, that the Plaintiffs 
submitted to the search under duress, and did not, in fact, consent. 
Battery: The elements of a civil cause of action for battery 
applicable to this case13 are the intentional infliction of a 
harmful or offensive contact to the person of another.14 These 
13
 In order to simplify the issues, the complicated 
phrasing of the hornbooks, intended to include cases of 
transferred intent or intent merely to cause apprehension, 
but not actual harm, has been deleted. It does not appear 
that these additional elements contribute anything to the 
present discussion, therefore they have been avoided where 
possible. 
14
 See, for example, Restatement 2d. Torts §18/ Handbook 
on the Law of Torts 5th Ed., William Prosser and Paige 
Keeton, West Publishing Co. 1988, pp. 39, §9. 
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elements have been explicitly testified to in at least two of the 
searches. The physical search of Rosa Mazariegos was full of 
offensive contacts with her person, from the hands run around her 
midriff to the pencil that was used to poke through her hair. 
(Record, pp. 446-447). Given, as has already been shown, that 
Esquivel clearly intended, at a minimum, an illegal and presumably 
offensive contact, all of the elements of a Battery are present. 
This is also true in the case of Mr. Semiday, where the individual 
conducting the search removed Mr. Semiday's shoes and socks. 
(Semiday Deposition, p. 41). Furthermore, the search of the 
remaining Plaintiffs' wallets, pockets, and other personal effects 
may constitute a technical battery, where those personal effects are 
shown to be connected to the Plaintiffs. 
The trial court erred in dismissing this cause of action for 
the same reasons previously discussed—i.e., the trial court found 
as a matter of law that no reasonable juror could rule in favor of 
the Plaintiffs on this issue. The trial court dismissed this cause 
of action in the same discussion and on the same grounds as he 
dismissed the cause of action for assault. Specifically, the trial 
court found that no reasonable jury could find in favor of the 
Plaintiffs because there was no evidence that defendants threatened 
plaintiffs with any violence or harm and because there was no 
evidence that defendant Esquivel intended the search of plaintiffs 
to cause harmful or offensive contact. 
The issues of consent, duress, and intent have been fully 
discussed above, in the section on assault, and the same discussion 
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is applicable here. To summarize the argument briefly, a reasonable 
jury could find for the Plaintiffs, on the grounds that either 1) 
their consent to an offensive touching was not reasonably implied 
under the circumstances, or that 2) any consent was obtained under 
duress. Furthermore, a reasonably jury could also find that 
Esquivel clearly intended to cause an offensive contact to the 
persons of the Plaintiffs where the search he ordered bore little or 
no relationship to the theft it was allegedly intended to discover, 
where the search had little or no likelihood of actually discovering 
a thief, and where Esquivel clearly stated his intent to order the 
search despite his awareness that it was illegal. 
Because a reasonably jury could find for the Plaintiffs on the 
facts of this matter, the trial court erred in dismissing the cause 
of action for battery, rather than permitting it to be determined by 
the jury. For this reason, the Plaintiffs' cause of action for 
battery must also be reversed and remanded for trial on the merits. 
False Imprisonment: The elements of a prima facie case for 
False Imprisonment under Utah law require that the Plaintiffs prove 
at trial that: 
By the exercise of force, or the express or implied threat of 
force, [they were] compelled to remain where [they] do not wish 
to remain or to go where [they] do not wish to go. The 
essential thing is the restraint of the person. If the words 
or conduct are such as to induce a reasonable apprehension of 
force, and the means of coercion are at hand, a person may be 
as effectually restrained and deprived of liberty as by prison 
bars. Hepworth v. Covey Bros. Amusement Co., 91 P.2d 507, 
(Utah) 1939. 
In Hepworth, two individuals acting as floorwalkers for a 
ballroom required two patrons to accompany them across the ballroom 
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floor to a room near the entrance of the ballroom. There was no 
evidence of force, other than the authority of the floorwalkers and 
their police uniforms. This case was tried to a jury, and the jury 
found for the Plaintiff. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court upheld 
the verdict. 
The Restatement 2d Torts uses different language to define the 
tort of false imprisonment. According to the Restatement, the 
applicable elements of the tort of False Imprisonment are "an 
action, intended to confine another within boundaries fixed by the 
actor, a resulting confinement, and a conscious awareness of the 
confinement." Restatement 2d Torts, §35. 
Although the definition of the Hepworth court fits within the 
Restatement definition, there is some variation in the terms used 
that deserves discussion here. In Hepworth the Utah Supreme Court 
held that "the exercise of force,... or the express or implied 
threat of force" was a required element of false imprisonment. In 
contrast, section §35 of the Restatement merely requires an action 
with the intent to confine, and actual confinement. Whether an "act 
done with the intent to confine that results in actual confinement" 
is the equivalent of the term "force," as used by the Utah Supreme 
Court in Hepworth, is an issue of law. 
It appears from the trial court's ruling in the present case 
that he read Hepworth to require some display of actual physical 
force, and that a verbal act, coupled with the power to cause actual 
economic and other harm to the Plaintiffs was not a sufficient 
threat to constitute actual or implied force. 
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At best, this holding on the part of the trial court minimizes 
the very real power that employers have over their employees in the 
modern world. At worst, this holding actually permits and 
legitimizes the abuse of this power, by allowing employers such as 
that in the present case, to act with impunity to require the 
complete submission of their employees to every whim, regardless of 
how unreasonable it may be. 
The trial court in the present case held that because no actual 
physical force was used to restrain them, Plaintiffs have no cause 
of action for False Imprisonment, because they could have walked out 
at any point. This ruling ignores the fact that, had the 
Plaintiffs gotten up and walked out of the factory rather than 
submit to the search, they would effectively have terminated their 
employment and subjected themselves to possible deportation. It is 
clear that under current Utah law, had the Plaintiffs walked out and 
been terminated for refusing to submit to the search, they would 
then have had a cause of action for wrongful termination in 
violation of public policy.15 The question presented by this case, 
however, is whether or not the individual must, without exception, 
attempt the escape and suffer the consequences before having a legal 
remedy for the Defendants' actions. Such an absolute legal 
principle is not in the public interest because it unfairly 
penalizes those uneducated and unsophisticated employees who do not 
15
 See, for example, Berube, supra, where it was held 
that forcing an employee to consent to a polygraph might 
raise such a cause of action. 
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know what their legal rights are until after those rights have been 
abused. Such a legal principle would require that in any set of 
circumstances comparable to the present facts, an employee with 
little or no knowledge of the law could lose all right to redress 
merely by submitting, and waiting until later to consult with an 
attorney. 
The better rule is the reasonable man standard established by 
the Restatement §36—that confinement may result from an act, 
whether that act involves actual physical force or not, intended to 
confine, that results in actual confinement. The Restatement rule 
would clearly not allow recovery in every case of non-physical 
threat, but nor would it allow recovery in every case of physical 
threat. Instead, the Restatement rule would subject the issue of 
actual confinement to a jury determination of reasonability. More 
specifically the Restatement would find a confinement where there 
was no reasonable means of escape. Restatement §3 6. Furthermore, 
the Restatement would require the trier of fact to determine whether 
or not the Plaintiffs' refusal in any given case to get up and walk 
out, was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. 
§36 of the Restatement defines what is reasonably required 
under the circumstances in terms of a continuum between, on the one 
hand, a means of escape of which the Plaintiffs were aware that only 
entailed a slight inconvenience or the minor risk of nominal 
liability, and, on the other hand, a means of escape that, under the 
total circumstances would be "such as to make it offensive to a 
reasonable sense of decency or personal dignity."Id. 
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The undisputed facts of the present case are that Defendant 
Esquivel was the plant manager; that Esquivel habitually verbally 
harassed, intimidated, and threatened the factory workers. The 
Plaintiffs have testified that Esquivel was angry when he ordered 
the search. They have further stated that he required them to 
remain away from their normal work area, and that he required them, 
one by one, to enter a bathroom and submit to a search. Plaintiffs 
have stated that the nearest exit was some thirty feet away, and 
that it was closed. (Record, pp. 420-457). 
The circumstances of this case would allow a jury to find in 
favor of either position. On the one hand, a jury might find that 
getting up and walking out would have caused the Plaintiffs, even in 
the event that they were fired, only a minor inconvenience, and that 
therefore the Plaintiffs were not confined. 
On the other hand, however, a reasonable jury might also find 
a) that because any individual worker who sought to escape would 
have had to walk a distance of some thirty feet from the cafeteria 
area to the door, b) that because, given the distance, it was 
impossible to tell whether the door had been locked, and whether 
escape was a real, or merely illusory possibility, and that c) 
because by getting up and walking out Plaintiffs would have 
effectively been quitting their jobs, to require Plaintiffs to 
escape in this manner was unreasonable. 
The trial court ruled in this case that no reasonable jury 
could find that the Plaintiffs were forced or compelled to remain in 
the cafeteria area, and enter the factory bathrooms one by one to 
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submit to the search of their persons. The trial court also ruled 
that Plaintiffs were not falsely imprisoned because, as a matter of 
law, they had a reasonable means of escape. But the trial court 
erred in ruling absolutely that it would be impossible for a 
reasonable jury to hold in the Plaintiffs' favor in this case. The 
facts of the present case are susceptible to more than one 
interpretation. Therefore, the issues of whether there was a 
reasonable exit such that Plaintiffs were not confined, and of 
whether Plaintiffs consented to remain or whether there was a 
substantial threat of force such that Plaintiffs were compelled to 
remain under duress, are questions for the jury to decide, not the 
judge. 
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: According to the 
Restatement, this is a comparatively new cause of action in tort. 
However, it is one that the Utah courts have expressly recognized.16 
The elements of this cause of action have been stated by the Utah 
Supreme Court as the intentional causing of severe emotional 
distress through extreme and outrageous conduct. Pentecost, Id., at 
700. This definition was set forth in a case with facts analogous 
to those of the instant case. In Pentecost, a landlord's agent 
16
 See, for example, Matter of Estate of Grimm, 784 P.2d 
1238, (Utah App. 1989) Utah Court of Appeals held that 
evidence was sufficient to present a jury question as to 
whether Defendants were liable for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress; Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696 (Utah 
1985), In reversing the lower court's grant of Summary 
Judgment to the defendant, the Utah Supreme Court held that 
material issues of fact existed as to whether a the self 
help actions of a landlord's agent raised a claim for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
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resorted to self help, rather than legal process, in evicting the 
Plaintiff and her children and seizing their personal belongings, 
allegedly as compensation for non-payment of rent. As in the 
present case, the agent's self-help remedies were illegal. 
Retherford v. AT&T Communications, 844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992) is 
another Utah case that examines a summary judgement in favor of the 
Defendant on a cause of action for Intentional Infliction of 
Emotional Distress. In that case, the Utah Supreme Court held that 
evidence of emotional stress—Plaintiff's psychologist told her not 
to return to work in her previous environment—and evidence that 
Defendant's employees had "shadowed her movements, intimidated her 
with threatening looks and remarks, and manipulated circumstances at 
work in ways that made her job more stressful," was sufficient to 
state a cause of action. _Id. In the present case, relatives of the 
Plaintiffs submitted affidavits testifying to the emotional and 
physical suffering caused the Plaintiffs by the Defendants' 
behavior. (Record, pp. 420-436). As causative actions, Plaintiffs 
allege that Esquivel used his position and power as plant manager to 
verbally and emotionally abuse Plaintiffs and to compel them to 
submit to an unlawful search of their persons and possessions. 
Another case that discusses the elements of this cause of 
action is Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 565 P.2d 1173 (Wash 
1977). In that case, the Washington Supreme Court, En Banc, 
determined that where a Mexican-American alleged that his employer 
had permitted other employees to engaged in deliberate taunts, 
slander, and racial epithets, and that this behavior on the part of 
his employer and co-workers had caused him to suffer severe 
emotional distress, due to the humiliations and public exposure to 
scorn and ridicule, was sufficient to state a cause of action for 
what Washington calls the Tort of Outrage. This case is cited in 
the Restatement 2d Torts §46, Definition of Intentional Infliction 
of Emotional Distress. Contreras is, of course, not controlling in 
Utah, but it is instructive, given the similarity of circumstances. 
The trial court in the present case held, as a matter of law, 
that no reasonable jury could find that the Defendants intended to 
cause the plaintiffs emotional distress, nor that the Defendants 
acted with reckless disregard to the probability of causing 
emotional distress. It is the Plaintiffs' position on appeal that 
in so ruling the trial court clearly erred. The Plaintiffs in the 
present case have testified that Esquivel admitted that he knew his 
actions were illegal. Plaintiffs have also testified that the 
Defendants almost exclusively hired Hispanic individuals with 
limited English capability—arguably a more vulnerable workforce 
than comparable U.S. citizens. Plaintiffs have further testified 
that Defendant Esquivel over a period of months verbally harassed, 
threatened, and accused them of theft and other illegal actions, 
including illegal entry into the U.S. Plaintiff Mazariegos has 
testified that the female supervisor who searched her picked through 
her hair with a pencil, allegedly as part of a search for a twenty 
dollar bill. These undisputed facts, when combined with reasonable 
inferences on the part of the Plaintiffs regarding the complete lack 
of reasonable relationship between the alleged theft of an 
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unidentifiable and unremarkable $20.00 bill, and the physical search 
of forty factory employees, could well support a finding that 
Defendants' sole intent in these circumstances was to humiliate the 
Plaintiffs and the other workers. 
The trial court's holding that, as a matter of law, no 
reasonable jury could possibly find that the Defendants' conduct 
constituted outrageous conduct is also clearly erroneous and must be 
reversed. The determination of what society considers to be 
outrageous is, like previous issues discussed in this brief, a mixed 
issue of law and fact. Because reasonable men could differ on the 
outrageousness of the Defendants' actions, in compelling nearly 
forty Hispanic immigrant workers, legal and illegal, to submit to a 
fruitless and baseless search of their persons and property, this is 
yet another factual issue which must be determined by a jury. 
Because the facts of the present case could support a jury 
finding in favor of the Plaintiffs on their cause of action for 
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, the trial court's 
implicit holding that no reasonable juror could find in favor of the 
Plaintiffs is clear error. Therefore, the trial court's grant of 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on this cause of action must 
be reversed and remanded for trial on the merits. 
Invasion of Privacy. The final three causes of action alleged 
by the Plaintiffs all involve the specific area of privacy labeled 
intrusion into private affairs. In order to establish an invasion 
of privacy claim of intrusion upon seclusion, a complaining party 
must prove by preponderance of the evidence an intentional 
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substantial intrusion, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or 
seclusion of the complaining party that would be highly offensive to 
the reasonable person.17 
Counts 7 & 8. The first two claims for invasion of 
privacy are based on the physical search of the Plaintiffs' persons 
and personal possessions. In granting summary judgement for the 
Defendants on these causes of action, the trial court ruled that as 
a matter of law the Defendants' search of the Plaintiffs' persons 
and personal effects did not constitute an unreasonable intrusion 
into their seclusion. This statement of the trial court's holding 
does not distinguish between the two possible legal rulings upon 
which the holding might be based. The first is the holding that, as 
a matter of law, no reasonable jury could find that the physical 
search of the persons and personal effects of the Plaintiffs in the 
present matter was unreasonable or highly offensive. The second is 
the holding that, as a matter of law, no employee in Utah has any 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their physical person and 
personal effects while at their place of employment. 
The first of these legal rulings is insufficient to support the 
grant of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Like other issues 
previously discussed in this brief, this legal holding depends on 
the determination by the trial court of a mixed issue of law and 
fact that is, except in extremely unusual circumstances, considered 
the province of the jury. 
17
 Turner v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 832 P.2d 
62, 67 (Utah App. 1992). 
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The language ^highly offensive to the reasonable person' 
suggests a determination of fact for which a jury is uniquely 
qualified.18 
On the undisputed facts of the present case, for all of the reasons 
discussed in previous sections of this brief, a jury could find that 
the Defendants' actions, in restraining and physically searching the 
Plaintiffs without probable, or even reasonable cause, were highly 
offensive, and would have been to the reasonable person. Thus, this 
holding cannot support the trial court's grant of summary judgment. 
The second of these holdings also purports to be a legal 
principle. But the only legal principle that would support the 
trial court's failure to submit this case to a jury is the absolute 
principle that, as a matter of law, no employee in the state of Utah 
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in their physical person and 
personal effects while at their place of employment. Anything less 
than an absolute ruling on this issue would require the matter to be 
submitted to a jury for a determination of whether the Plaintiffs 
had a reasonable expectation of privacy and seclusion in their 
persons and personal effects, even while in the work place. Neither 
this Court nor the Utah Supreme Court has ever ruled directly on 
such a case. During the course of this appeal, this Court may 
choose to adopt the standard applied by the trial court, and affirm 
the trial court's dismissal of these two causes of action. However, 
it is the Plaintiffs' position that such an absolute standard is 
unnecessary and contrary to public policy. Rather, the Plaintiffs 
Turner, supra. 
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would argue that a more reasoned approach, and one more consistent 
with previous Utah case law on this issue, is the position set forth 
in §652B of the Restatement. 
The Restatement 2d Torts §652B, as cited in Cox v. Hatch, 761 
P.2d 556 (Utah 1988), establishes a cause of action for unreasonable 
intrusion upon the seclusion of another. §652B defines the specific 
elements of the tort of Intrusion upon Seclusion as: the intentional 
intrusion, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion 
of another or his private affairs or concerns, where the intrusion 
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. There are two key 
phrases in this definition: "intrusion, physically or otherwise, 
upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or 
concerns" and "highly offensive to a reasonable person." The 
second phrase concerns the standard which a jury must apply to 
determine whether the parties' actions, given the undisputed facts, 
were reasonable or unreasonable. The first phrase contains two 
elements of the legal cause of action for invasion of privacy, or 
Intrusion upon Seclusion. In the present case the first element, 
an intrusion, is an undisputed fact. Thus, the basis for the trial 
court's ruling becomes the question of whether this intrusion was 
upon the solitude or seclusion of another. 
In Cox, supra, the Utah Supreme Court held that the 
publication of photographs of the Plaintiffs, taken in a public 
place at a public event, did not constitute an invasion of privacy 
because the Plaintiffs had no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
such a situation. In the present case, the Defendants contend that 
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an actionable "intrusion into Plaintiffs' seclusion" is limited to 
intrusion upon Plaintiffs in the privacy of their own homes or 
automobiles. But it is the Plaintiffs1 contention that, in 
accordance with the Restatement §652B, the privacy rights of an 
individual extend not merely to a dwelling or automobile, but also 
to their physical persons and such personal effects as purses and 
wallets. Plaintiffs further contend that, without reasonable cause, 
the subjection of these personal effects to physical search is an 
actionable invasion of privacy. The search in the present matter is 
not comparable to a locker or desk search. The Plaintiffs were 
specifically told that they and their personal effects were going to 
be physically searched. Although the level of actual intrusion then 
depended upon the supervisor doing the searching, the fact that some 
were forced to submit to more invasive searches does not obviate the 
fact that the privacy interests of each Plaintiff, in his or her 
person and property, were invaded. 
Privacy in the Workplace, supra, has an entire chapter devoted 
to the legality of work place searches of employee's persons and 
property. The authors reach the conclusion, at the end of this 
chapter, that 
the legality of a search hinges essentially on the manner, 
scope, justification and location of it. Searches of people 
attract greater judicial scrutiny than inspections of places, 
given the higher level of intrusiveness involved. . . . the 
central issue usually boils down to whether the employee had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the area in question. Id. 
p.169. 
This position is supported by the Restatement,§652B, where one of 
the specific examples given to illustrate this cause of action is an 
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illegal search of an individual's wallet. This illustration is 
directly on point in the present case. 
As a matter of law, this Court must decide whether Plaintiffs' 
persons and private affairs and concerns might reasonably be held to 
be secluded under their clothing, and in their pockets, wallets, 
purses, and lunch bags, or whether, on the contrary, no Utah 
employee has any reasonable expectation of privacy in these areas 
while at her place of employment. If this Court holds that an 
employee in Utah might reasonably have an expectation of privacy in 
her person and personal effects, even while in the workplace, then 
the trial court's ruling granting Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment on these causes of action must be reversed, and these 
causes of action, along with the others, must be remanded for a 
jury to determine whether, on the actual facts of the present case, 
the Plaintiffs' expectation of privacy in these areas was 
reasonable, and whether, on the actual facts of the present case, 
the Defendants' invasion of these areas would have been highly 
offensive to a reasonable person. 
Again, a jury might find that the Plaintiffs' alleged consent 
will bar recovery on this cause of action. On the other hand, as 
with the causes of action previously discussed, a jury might also 
find that Plaintiffs did not consent, and that the broad based, 
coercive nature of the search, without reasonable cause, would 
permit a recovery on this cause of action. 
Count 9. The final cause of action is also one for 
Invasion of Privacy, or Intrusion into the Personal Affairs of 
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another. Thus, the same elements, of an unreasonable or highly 
offensive intrusion into an area where one has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, must be established. The factual basis for 
this final cause of action differ from that of the previous causes 
of action. However, the material facts are again undisputed. As 
stated above, it is an undisputed fact that, during Plaintiff 
Semiday's first employment interview with the Defendant company, 
Defendant Esquivel requested, as a purported condition of 
employment, that Semiday show him his LDS temple recommend. As a 
matter of public policy, Federal and State anti-discrimination 
statutes stand, in part, for the principle that the employment 
decisions of businesses, with the exception of a limited category of 
religiously owned and operated businesses, should not be made on the 
basis of the prospective employee's religious affiliation or 
standing. This is true even where the business is discriminating in 
favor of a specific category, and thus an individual would have no 
legal cause of action under either of those laws. Because this is a 
matter of public policy, this Court should hold herein that, as a 
matter of law, all Utah employees have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the workplace regarding their religious standing and 
status. While an employee may choose, during the course of 
employment, to reveal certain facts, this choice should, as a matter 
of law, remain the employee's, not the employer's. 
Because Utah employees have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the workplace regarding their religious standing and status, and 
because, as in the previous two causes of action, the fact of an 
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intrusion is uncontested, the remaining issues for this Court to 
determine are 1) whether a jury might reasonably find that the 
Defendant's intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable 
person, and thus unreasonable, and 2) whether a jury might 
reasonably find that Defendant's intrusion was not protected by 
consent on the part of Plaintiff Semiday. 
It is important, in determining whether a reasonable person 
might find the Defendant's intrusion highly offensive, to note that 
the fact that an LDS church member does or does not have a temple 
recommend is indicative of even more personal, intensely private 
facts, than the simple question may indicate. An answer to that 
question provides an employer with information regarding sexual 
habits, smoking and drinking habits, the individual's financial 
affairs, and involvement with the LDS Church. A reasonable person 
might consider any or all of these areas deeply private and 
personal; because this is the case, a reasonable person might also 
find that a strange employer's intrusion into this area of a 
prospective employee's personal life was highly offensive and thus 
unreasonable. 
The last factor which must be determined in deciding whether 
the trial court's ruling on this cause of action was appropriate is 
the issue of consent. Although the facts underlying this last cause 
of action are different from the facts underlying each of the 
previous causes of action, the issue of consent involves some 
parallel considerations. As in each of those causes of action, the 
basic facts may be interpreted in more than one way. A jury might 
38 
find that Semiday's failure to immediately object to this request on 
the part of his prospective employer, and his actions in taking out 
the recommend and giving it to the Defendant, are reasonably 
interpreted as freely given consent. But because Semiday did not 
expressly consent to this violation of his legal rights, his consent 
must be implied from the totality of the circumstances. Restatement 
2d Torts §892. Therefore, a jury might also find that, given the 
employment interview setting, the relative power of the parties, 
Semiday's lack of legal knowledge and sophistication and his 
dependence upon the good will of this prospective employer, it would 
be unreasonable for that employer to believe, merely because the 
prospective employee failed to object, that the employee freely 
consented to this intrusion into his personal affairs. 
Because the facts of this matter establish a cognizable claim 
for invasion of privacy, in that 1) a jury could reasonably find 
that the Defendant intruded unreasonably into an area of Plaintiff's 
personal affairs where 2) he had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, and that 3) this intrusion would be highly offensive to the 
reasonable person, and that 4) the Defendant, given the totality of 
the circumstances, could not reasonably infer that the Plaintiff 
freely consented to this invasion of his privacy, the trial court 
erred in holding as a matter of law that Summary Judgment for the 
Defendants was appropriate. Because reasonable minds could find in 
favor of the Plaintiff on this cause of action, Summary Judgment on 
this cause of action must also be reversed and remanded for trial on 
the merits. 
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ISSUE II, Whether the trial court erred in ruling as a matter 
of law that because Plaintiffs had not submitted any evidence 
of damages of monetary or emotional damages, Defendants were 
entitled to Summary Judgment, where 1) the Plaintiffs had 
submitted their own and the affidavits of family members as 
evidence of actual emotional damages, as well as 2) the Report 
of one Expert Witness and the Affidavit of another, and where 
3) the causes of action alleged were for the intentional torts 
of wrongful detention, assault, battery, false imprisonment, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion of 
privacy• 
The issue of the Plaintiffs' ability to prove actual damages in 
this case was a significant factor in the trial court's ruling that 
as a matter of law Plaintiffs had failed to state a legally 
sufficient cause of action on any of their claims. Specifically, at 
oral argument on this Motion the trial court expressed several times 
his concern that Plaintiffs had no actual evidence of damages, 
despite the affidavits of the Plaintiffs and their family members, 
submitted in opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment.19 Because this was such a significant concern, the trial 
court delayed ruling on the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
for several months, and requested that Plaintiffs obtain and submit 
to the trial court actual evidence of their damages, in order to 
permit the trial court to rule in their favor. (Record, pp. 785-
787) . 
Finally, both the Order prepared by the Defendants and the 
trial court's own Memorandum Decision cite the alleged failure of 
the Plaintiffs to provide any evidence of damages as a basis for 
Granting the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on each of 
Record, pp. 420-457. 
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Plaintiffs' causes of action.20 In addition to all the purported 
legal reasons previously discussed as justification and support for 
the trial court's ruling in favor of Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, the trial court expressly stated in its Memorandum 
Decision that "lacking any evidence that plaintiffs have incurred 
any monetary or psychological damages resulting from the search 
conducted by defendants, the Court finds the plaintiffs have no 
cause of action against defendants."(Record, pp. 685-686). 
This ruling of the trial court's is so clearly erroneous on so 
many different grounds as to be ludicrous. First, the trial court 
is factually wrong. Second, the trial court is legally wrong on 
l)the legal admissibility of Plaintiffs' testimony regarding 
emotional damages; 2) the legal admissibility of Plaintiffs' Expert 
Witnesses Report; 3) the legal standard of evidence required, both 
as a) pertains to Plaintiffs' burden of proof on this issue in the 
present Motion for Summary Judgment and b) as pertains to proof of 
compensatory and general damages sufficient to permit recovery under 
the alleged causes of action; and finally, 4) the trial court 
ignores the settled law that a Plaintiff who states a prima facie 
case for an intentional tort such as Assault, Battery, False 
Imprisonment, or Invasion of Privacy may, even where there are no 
actual damages, recover nominal damages for the simple violation of 
a legally protected interest. 
See Hearing Transcript, February 10, 1995, Record, pp. 
782-783; 781-782; Order, Record, p. 701; Memorandum 
Decision, Record, pp. 687-685. 
Trial Court's Ruling is Factually Wrong. The trial court's 
ruling that Plaintiffs had submitted no evidence to support their 
monetary and psychological/emotional damages is simply factually 
wrong. In support of their Objection to Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment, the Plaintiffs filed, on November 1, 1994, eight 
affidavits. Each of these eight affidavits testifies to the 
emotional and/or physical devastation caused by the Defendants' 
actions. Plaintiffs and their families testified that as a direct 
result of the search to which they were subjected, the Plaintiffs 
suffered humiliation, embarrassment, extreme anxiety, depression, 
and a general sense of powerlessness. Three of these affidavits 
testify implicitly to actual monetary damages resulting from one 
Plaintiff's near nervous breakdown, caused by the search to which 
the Defendants subjected her, that directly resulted in her complete 
emotional inability to seek new employment for a period of months. 
Trial Court's Ruling is Legally Wrong. 
Plaintiffs' Affidavits are Legally Admissible. In 
the face of this testimony, the Defendants argued that the 
Plaintiffs' supplemental affidavits were inadmissible because they 
were submitted after the Plaintiffs' Depositions had been taken. 
The Defendants further alleged in their Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' 
Affidavits that the Affidavits were inadmissible because they 
contradicted the Deposition testimony. But despite the fact that 
the Defendants filed their Motion to Strike some five months after 
they received the Plaintiffs' Supplemental Affidavits, the Defendants 
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did not ever cite a single example of such a contradiction.21 In fact, the Defendants 
themselves state that "[the Affidavits] are an attempt to expand 
from the sole issue related to the checking or searching to one of 
general allegation of rude and disrespectful treatment in the work 
place." (Record, p. 626, emphasis added). And "in her Affidavit, 
Rosa Mazariegos, attempting to expand her damages well beyond what 
she stated in her Deposition. . ." (Record, p. 625, emphasis added). 
Affidavits offered to expand on Deposition testimony, where such 
expansions do not materially contradict the Deposition testimony are 
not inadmissable. 
All of these issues, however, were raised and addressed in the 
Defendants' Motion to Strike and/or Disregard, and the Plaintiffs' 
Memorandum in Opposition to that Motion. However, although the 
trail court apparently did disregard the Plaintiffs' affidavit 
testimony regarding the damages they suffered, as a matter of 
procedure the trial court declined to rule on the Defendants' Motion 
to Strike.(Record, p.685). Therefore, as a factual matter, this 
testimony remains in the record in support of Plaintiffs' opposition 
to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
But, regardless of whether Plaintiffs' Affidavit testimony 
remained in the record, the trial court did not cite, discuss, or in 
any other way appear to have considered these Affidavits as valid 
evidentiary testimony when it held that Plaintiffs had submitted no 
evidence to support any possible damage claim. Because the trial 
21
 Record, pp. 621-628; see also pp. 655-654; pp. 674-
675; pp. 641-658; and pp. 621-628. 
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court did not rule on the Defendants' Motion to Strike, there is no 
express explanation for the courts' disregard of this evidence. But 
a statement the trial court made at oral argument may provide some 
explanation for the court's failure to consider this evidence. 
Specifically, the court stated: 
But I can tell you, your people thoughts and feelings that are 
not appropriate for Cross Examination and may not even be 
admitted into evidence. It may not even get to a question on 
those [sic] .22 
If this is indeed the trial court's justification for ignoring the 
factual testimony regarding emotional damages, the court errs in 
believing that Plaintiffs' testimony regarding their thoughts and 
feelings is inadmissible. More specifically, this statement is 
untenable as a statement of legal principle where, as in every single one 
of Plaintiffs'eight separate causes of action, an actionable element of either the 
specific tort or of resulting general damages is specifically a 
mental or emotional harm. Where a tort is either intended in full or in 
part to protect individuals from mental or emotional damage, or 
where an element of the prima facie case concerns a particular 
mental state, testimony regarding the Plaintiffs' mental thoughts 
and feelings is admissible, highly relevant, and probative.23 
Plaintiffs' Expert Witness Report & Affidavit Legally 
Admissible. Even assuming, strictly for the sake of this argument, 
that the trial court was correct in ignoring the Plaintiffs' 
22
 Record, p. 786. 
23
 See, e.g., Boies v. Raynor, 361 P.2d 1, 3, 89 Ariz. 
257 (Ariz. 1961). 
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affidavit testimony for one reason or another, the Plaintiffs also 
submitted, as evidence in support of their emotional damages, the 
Report of Dr. Juan Mejia and the Affidavit of Dr. Linda Gummow. 
This evidence alone should be sufficient to establish an issue 
regarding the factual existence of actual damages. However, the 
trial court, in its Memorandum Decision, ruled as a matter of law 
that Dr. Mejia's report was inadmissible. The trial court stated 
that Dr. Mejia's report was inadmissible a) because it was not 
submitted in affidavit form and therefore must be considered 
hearsay, and b) because the report cannot be admitted into evidence 
as a statement for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment under 
Utah Rule of Evidence 803(4) as an exception to the hearsay rule 
because the evaluation by Dr. Mejia was performed solely to aid the 
pursuit of litigation, nor for the purpose of diagnosis to promote 
treatment. 
Solely for the practical purposes of this appeal, Plaintiffs 
will not challenge the legal validity of the first of these rulings, 
although as a practical matter, this report was submitted in direct 
response to the trial court's request for examples of precisely how 
Plaintiffs intended to prove their factual damages at trial. 
Because, had this matter gone to trial, Dr. Mejia would have been 
available to provide the necessary foundation to establish the 
admissibility of this report, the trial court's refusal to consider 
it as evidence even of what Plaintiffs might prove at trial seems 
contrary to Utah Rule of Evidence 102, which states that: 
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These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in 
administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, 
and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence 
to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings 
justly determined. 
However, even if Dr. Mejia's Evaluation Report is hearsay, it is 
still admissible as evidence in this matter, despite the fact that 
it was prepared solely to aid the pursuit of litigation. This is 
because the trial court interprets incorrectly Utah Rule of Evidence 
803(4). Contrary to the trial court's actual holding, Utah Rule of 
Evidence 803(4) does not bar a psychological report that is 
prepared, whether to aid in the pursuit of litigation or not, "for 
purposes of medical [or psychological] diagnosis or treatment."24 
In fact, this rule was specifically adopted specifically to avoid 
the result that occurred in this case below. According to the 
advisory committee notes: 
Conventional doctrine has excluded from the hearsay 
exception, as not within its guarantee of truthfulness, 
statements to a physician consulted only for the purpose of 
enabling him to testify. While these statements were not 
admissible as substantive evidence, the expert was allowed to 
state the basis of his opinion, including statements of this 
kind. The distinction thus called for was one most unlikely to 
be made by juries. The rule accordingly rejects the 
limitation.25 
Because Dr. Mejia's evaluation does provide actual diagnoses of the 
emotional and psychological damage the Plaintiffs' suffered at the 
24
 See, e.g., State v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215, 1222 
(Utah 1986); Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 950 (4th Cir. 
1988); U.S. v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430, 436 (8th Cir. 1985). 
25
 Notes of Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules, 28 
U.S.C.A. Rule 803, at 279 (West 1984); cited in State v. 
Schreuder, supra, at 1223. 
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time their causes of action arose, this report falls into the 
exception established by Utah Rule of Evidence 803(4) to the general 
rule that hearsay is inadmissible. Therefore, the trial court erred 
in ruling it inadmissible and refusing to consider it as evidence of 
Plaintiffs' actual damages. Because the trial court ruled that the 
affidavit of Plaintiffs' second expert witness was inadmissible 
solely because it was based on Dr. Mejia's Report, this affidavit is 
also admissible as evidence of Plaintiffs' damages. 
The trial court further erred in ruling as a matter of law that 
the Plaintiffs, without expert witness testimony, could not 
establish emotional damages sufficient to sustain any of their 
causes of action. This ruling, reduced to its essence, produces a 
completely absurd result—basically, this holding would bar any 
plaintiff who could not afford to obtain professional treatment from 
ever recovering damages for emotional suffering and harm. 
Expert Witness Testimony not Required to Prevail against 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Fortunately, proof of emotional 
damages does not, as an absolute rule of law, require the testimony 
of an expert witness. This is particularly true where, as in the 
present case, the issue of damages arises in the context of a Motion 
for Summary Judgment. In ruling on a Motion for Summary Judgment, 
it is not the province of the trial court to assess the sufficiency 
of the evidence.26 Where, as in the present case, the material 
facts are uncontroverted, the trial court must assume for the 
Singleton, supra, at 128. 
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purpose of determining the Motion, that the party opposing the 
Motion has sufficiently proven its alleged facts, and that, unless 
the moving party is, on those fact, entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law, the Motion for Summary Judgment must be denied.27 
Therefore, the trial court erred in the present case when he ruled 
that only expert witness testimony of damages would be sufficient to 
prevent a ruling for the Defendants on their Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Where the Defendants, as the party moving for Summary 
Judgment, had failed to submit any sworn testimony in contradiction 
to Plaintiffs' Affidavits and the Report and Affidavit of their 
Expert Witnesses, the trial court's findings that there were no 
material disputed facts regarding the existence of damages, and that 
damages did not exist, were clearly in violation of all standard 
practice and procedure with regard to Motions for Summary 
Judgment.28 
Plaintiffs' Causes of Action do Not Require Expert Witness 
Testimony to Recover Damages. Even if this issue had arisen in 
another context, the law would not have supported a blanket 
dismissal of each of the Plaintiffs' eight separate causes of action 
merely because there was no expert witness testimony to support an 
award for emotional damages. This is so for two reasons. First, 
27
 See, e.g., TS 1 Partnership v. Allred, 877 P.2d 156, 
158 (Utah App. 1994); Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 
P.2d 950, 957 (Utah App. 1989); W.M. Barnes Co. v. Sohio 
Nat. Res. Co., 627 P.2d 56, 58-59 (Utah 1981). 
28
 Record, p. 686. 
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because no reasonable jury could find in their favor on any of their 
eight causes of action. In so ruling the trial court made 
impermissible factual determinations regarding the sufficiency of 
the evidence and regarding the reasonable inferences to be drawn 
from the facts in areas of mixed law and fact that are traditionally 
the responsibility of the jury to decide. 
Furthermore, the trial court erred both on the facts and on the 
law in holding that Defendants were entitled to Summary Judgment as 
a matter of law because Plaintiffs had submitted no evidence 
sufficient to support an award of damages on any of their eight 
causes of action. 
Because the trial court erred on these issues, and because the 
undisputed facts are sufficient, as a matter of law, to support a 
ruling by a jury in Plaintiffs' favor on each of their causes of 
action, this entire case must be reversed and remanded for trial on 
y the merits. . 
DATED this L6th day of January, 1996. 
iTTTL. JONES 
Attorney fox Plaintiffs 
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some of Plaintiffs' causes of action do not require expert witness 
testimony to establish damages. For example: 
In a civil action to recover damages for assault and battery, 
any evidence that will fairly show the nature and extent of the 
injuries received and the pecuniary loss suffered by the 
plaintiff as a result of such injuries is generally admissible. 
Assault and Battery, 6 Am Jur 2d, §218.29 
Secondly, some or all of Plaintiffs' alleged causes of action do not 
require proof of any damages whatsoever in order to recover nominal 
damages .30 
In conclusion, the trial court erred in holding that Plaintiffs 
had failed to provide any evidence of emotional or pecuniary damage 
and that the testimony of Plaintiffs' Expert Witnesses was 
inadmissible. The trial court also erred in holding as a matter of 
law that Plaintiffs could recover no damages, nominal or 
compensatory, on any of their eight causes of action, simply because 
they allegedly failed to offer expert witness testimony in 
opposition to a Motion for Summary Judgment. As a matter of both 
fact and law, the trial court's holding on this issue is clearly 
erroneous and must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in ruling on the undisputed facts that 
Defendants were entitled to Summary Judgment as a matter of law 
29
 See also, Hepworth, supra, at 510. 
30
 See, e.g., Hepworth, id; Jeppsen v. Jensen, 155 P. 
429, 431 (Utah 1916), 47 Utah 536; Marshall v. District of 
Columbia, 391 A.2d 1374, 1382 (D.C. App. 1978); Sutherland 
v. Kroger Co., 110 S.E.2d 716, 724 (W.Va. 1959); Aquino v. 
Bulletin Co., 154 A.2d 422, 426 (Penn. Sup. Ct. 1959); Lacey 
v. Laird, 139 N.E. 2d 25, 31 (Ohio 1956) 166 Ohio St. 12. 
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